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SUMMARY 
 
In 2011, the UK government set in motion a process to establish a formal biodiversity offsetting programme 
in England, as an attempt to tackle biodiversity loss as a result of development. Drawing on critical 
approaches to the commodification of nature, this article traces the dilemmas encountered by the UK 
government in its endeavours to roll out a biodiversity offsetting programme in the English planning system. 
Based on 34 in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, documentary analysis and participant observation at 
policy-focused events, the paper aims to show how the promise of reconciling development and conservation 
proved difficult to deliver. In government attempts to enrol sympathetic actors, disputes emerged over the 
purpose and fine detail of the proposals. Deeper tensions were revealed in clashes between governmental 
emphasis on deregulation and DGYRFDWHV¶FDOOVIRUVWURQJPDQGDWRU\UXOHVDQGwell-resourced oversight, while 
efforts to balance complex ecology with market demands for simplicity and certainty undermined the promise 
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of objective biodiversity metrics delivering uncontroversial hard numbers. Though the English case is in many 
ways context-specific, the problems experienced raise wider political questions around establishing 
meaningful offsetting schemes in any part of the world. 
Keywords: biodiversity, biodiversity offsetting, commodification of nature, England, market 
environmentalism, regulation, UK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The problematic relationship between delivering continued economic growth and meeting international 
commitments to reverse biodiversity decline has led to growing academic and policy interest in biodiversity 
offsetting (Benabou 2014). Biodiversity offsets encompass a range of market-orientated compensation 
mechanisms, and involve µconservation actions intended to compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm to 
biodiversity caused by development projects¶ (ten Kate et al. 2004, p. 13). The term residual refers to 
FRPSHQVDWLRQ¶VSODFHZLWKLQWKHPLWLJDWLRQKLHUDUFK\DVDPHDVXUHRIODVWUHVRUWDIWHUharm has first been 
avoided and then mitigated as far as possible. While on-site or off-site compensation for environmental 
damage is often a requirement of development consent regimes, offsetting specifically opens the terrain for 
trading commensurable biodiversity units across space. It aims at no net loss of biodiversity, measured using 
quantitative valuation techniques to ensure consistent accounting for loss and gain at either end of the process 
(Gardner et al. 2013)2IIVHWWLQJ¶VRULJLQVOLHLQ86$¶V wetlands mitigation schemes, beginning in the 1970s, 
and the subsequent emergence of mitigation banking programmes during the 1990s (Robertson 2004). There 
were 45 compensatory mitigation programmes operational worldwide in 2011, with another 27 at various 
stages of development (Madsen et al. 2011).  
Proponents argue that used properly, offsetting offers benefits for both the economy and environment, 
through more efficient permitting systems and land use (ten Kate et al. 2004). Furthermore, as environmental 
economists have argued, through quantitative valuation and standardization, market mechanisms and 
regulatory enforcement making GHYHORSHUVSD\IRUGDPDJHELRGLYHUVLW\¶VWUXHYDOXHLVPDGHHFRQRPLFDOO\
visible in traditional accounting ledgers, and thus are taken more seriously by decision-makers (Bayon & 
Jenkins 2010). Such claims sit within the paradigm of the green economy, which promises a reconciliation of 
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economic development and environmental sustainability, and the reconstitution of the non-human world under 
concepts such as ecosystem services and natural capital, and increasing moves towards the use of market-
based instruments for conservation (see for instance Sukhdev 2010).  
I investigate the troubled casHRIWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VPRYHVWRGHYHORSDIRUPDOELRGLYHUVLW\
offsetting programme, for use in the English planning system to deliver no net loss of biodiversity as a result 
of development. There already exists a considerable literature that raises theoretical and practical questions 
related to the commodification of nature (Castree 2003; Prudham 2009). Drawing on this critical literature, I 
examine how the difficulties, dilemmas and tensions identified by scholars have been played out in this 
particular case. By doing so, I identify broader issues about the obstacles to establishing biodiversity offsetting 
schemes in any given context. The intention is to draw attention to the political economic conditions 
policymakers are required to navigate in reality, something too often ignored in studies of offsetting. I seek to 
demonstrate how problems of practical implementation encountered in the UK reflect the particular political 
context of land regulation in the UK, but can also be traced back to the more abstract and theoretical tensions 
involved in any attempt to commodify nature under neoliberal constraints. After a brief overview of 
biodiversity offsetting and critical perspectives on the commodification of nature, I will concentrate on the 
UK case study, drawing on empirical data collected between 2013 and 2014. The history of the polic\¶V
development, the arguments advanced by those advocating offsetting as a solution to biodiversity loss, and the 
practical problems encountered by the state in its efforts to put the system into operation are discussed, as well 
as the findings of the research and its wider implications for other contexts.  
 
Commodification and environmental market-making 
 
The growing appeal of biodiversity offsetting can be seen as part of a movement not only to inscribe nature 
with economic value, but to see environmental markets as the most effective method of conserving those 
values (Gomez-Baggethun & Ruiz-Perez 2011). Critical environmental geographers and political ecologists 
have long drawn attention to the increasingly pervasive neoliberal form of environmental governance (Heynen 
et al. 2007; Castree 2008a, b), while one strand of scholarship has focused on a specific neoliberal paradigm 
of conservation (Büscher et al. 2014). The logic of neoliberal conservation suggests nature can only be 
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conserved in and through capitalism, by submission to capital and revaluation in capitalist terms (Büscher et 
al. 2012). The increasing turn to environmental markets is understood in this literature to be part of the 
growing commodification of nature, expressed as µVHOOLQJQDWXUHWRVDYHLW¶LQRQHRIWKHILHOG¶VIRXQGDWLRQDO
texts (McAfee 1999).  
While the concern in this paper is not simply commodification, the literature identifies a series of 
tensions, which are useful for shedding critical light on the difficulties and dilemmas of environmental 
market-making, such as the project undertaken by the UK government. Emphasis is made on the 
inappropriateness of the analytical categories of neoclassical and neoliberalism, which separate nature into 
discrete and exchangeable units (Büscher et al. 2012), and on how commodification requires the assignment 
of monetary values and property rights to demarcated natural entities, as though produced solely for exchange 
(Castree 2003; Prudham 2009). Instead, human and non-human natures are posited as always produced in part 
outside the relations of exchange, inextricably bound up and produced, materially, symbolically and 
discursively, through much wider coproductive socioecological processes (Heynen et al. 2006). Their values 
are thus always understood to be politically mediated, historically and geographically specific processes. 
Central to this literature is the insistence that environmental market-making is an inherently 
constructive and irreducibly political project. The ways such tensions and dilemmas faced by policymakers 
play out will be refracted through a number of contingent factors, such the characteristics of the particular 
natures to be traded; the constellation of institutional, social, political and ideological forces which cohere 
around it; the ability of policymakers to reconcile the positions and values of different actors; the capacity and 
willingness of the state to intervene on a meaningful scale; and the prevailing legal and regulatory frameworks 
for nature conservation and land-use regulation.  
In the case of biodiversity offsets, policymakers are offered a plausible path through the dilemmas of 
biodiversity loss and regulatory obstacles to growth, while its market-based underpinnings fit with prevailing 
models of neoliberal governance (Penca 2013). Offsetting rhetorically promotes a system of financial 
GLVLQFHQWLYHVWRPRGLI\GHYHORSHUV¶EHKDYLRXUZLWKRXWUHVRUWLQJWRWD[DWLRQRUGLUHFWLQWHUYHQWLRQDWWKH
same time as leveraging private finance for conservation, in a climate where expanded public spending is seen 
as politically undesirable or unfeasible. In the process of creating offset markets, one of the central concerns 
for the state is the construction of a stable and fungible object of trade, defined and measured in a transparent 
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manner accepted by all the relevant actors: buyers, sellers and brokers; economists and regulators; ecological 
assessors and managers; and other key stakeholder groups. This is a particularly difficult task, given the 
deeply complex, interdisciplinary and contested nature of biodiversity as a political concept, through which 
social actors compete over how the natural world should be understood, valued, and governed (Takacs 1996; 
Vadrot 2014), and the imprecision, uncertainty and considerable knowledge gaps present in ecological 
science, conservation biology and restoration ecology (Burgin 2008; Maron et al. 2012).  
As a result of these difficulties, there is a particular need on the part of policymakers to enrol 
ecRORJLFDOVFLHQWLVWVDQGFRQVHUYDWLRQLVWVVLQFHRIIVHWWLQJ¶VOHJLWLPDF\UHOLHVKHDYLO\RQWKHDGHTXDF\DQG
integrity of the currencies and metrics (Walker et al. 2009). As Robertson (2006) has shown in the case of 
wetlands mitigation banking in the USA, ecologists play a critical role at the interface of science and policy, 
where their particular job is to certify the value of the commodities traded, constrained by the material and 
social constellations of power in ecosystem markets. This requires an act of translation from the sphere of 
ecological science to those of economics and law, where actors and institutions need data to be codified and 
legible in certain ways, with stable identities across time and space. Given the deep complexities, ambiguities 
and uncertainties of wetland ecosystems, the science has great epistemological difficulty in providing the 
information needed by capital in an uncontroversial way. The tension between market functionality and 
regulatory simplicity on the one hand, and the complexity of biodiversity on the other, often appears to be the 
most persistent dilemma faced by the state, and one which is rarely resolved for long.  
 
METHODS 
 
I examined WKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VPRYHVWRWUial biodiversity offsets, with a view to national roll-out of the 
programme, between 2011 and 2015. The empirical analysis is based on a range of data collected between 
November 2013 and September 2014. Thirty-four in-depth interviews were undertaken, with a range of 
governmental and non-government actors. These included central government officials, public and private 
sector ecologists and natural scientists, conservationists, environmental campaigners, environmental 
economists, public policy consultants, land-use planners, developers, green business representatives, think 
tanks, landowner organizations, and local campaigners. Interviewees were identified and approached on the 
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basis of having some engagement with the design or piloting of biodiversity offsetting in England, or as 
members of organizations or groups likely to have a direct interest in any future national policy. Data was also 
gathered through participant observation at four practitioner and policy-focused events, and the collection of a 
range of documentary material. 
The purpose of analysing this wide variety of qualitative material was to build as full a picture as 
SRVVLEOHRIWKHFRPSOH[DUUD\RIHYHQWVDQGSURFHVVHVDWSOD\GXULQJWKHWLPHRIRIIVHWWLQJ¶VGHYHORSPHQWLQ
England. This deep analysis of multiple sources of data allows for the untangling and reconstruction of the 
complex narratives, ideologies and motivations of various actors, the relations of power between different 
groups, and the critical points of tension and struggle through which the process was politically mediated, 
with the objective of shedding light on the nature of the difficulties encountered and their wider implications 
for the UK and elsewhere. 
 
Background to the case study 
 
Prior to the 2010±2015 JRYHUQPHQW¶Vmoves to introduce a formal offsetting system, the mitigation hierarchy 
formed an element of existing planning consent in England, meaning off-site compensation was already 
possible. Planning authorities were obligated to ensure development observed the avoid, mitigate, compensate 
sequence in cases where biodiversity was a material concern through the now defunct Planning Policy 
Statement 9 (PPS9). PPS9 stipulated refusal of consent if the hierarchy was not observed, unless an overriding 
public interest case could be made in development proceeding (DCLG [UK Department of Communities and 
Local Government] 2005). Compensation, when it was used, tended to be done inconsistently, negotiated 
through Section 106 legal agreements with developers. The existing system however had been coming under 
increasing scrutiny, for both failing in its statutory duties to protect biodiversity (David Tyldesley and 
Associates 2012), and for the slow processing and granting of applications, delaying or derailing development 
projects. Especially since 2008, inflexible environmental regulation came to be viewed as a central 
impediment to economic recovery, with European protected sites and species taking particular criticism from 
politicians and developers (see for instance Milne 2012). 
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Investigations into offsetting had begun under the previous Labour administration, but the first 
concrete policy proposals came in 2011 under the newly-formed Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government. The Natural Environment White Paper (Defra [UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs] 2011) pledged to launch six two-year trials around the country, with a view to rolling out a national 
programme through the English planning system. The White Paper set out an ecosystem approach for 
protecting the natural environment while growing the green economy over the next five decades, building 
upon recommendations of national studies and a growing international policy literature, which stressed 
SODFLQJWKHQDWXUDOHQYLURQPHQW¶VHFRQRPLFYDOXHat the heart of policy and suggesting the utility of market-
based instruments as a means of meeting those objectives. Biodiversity offsetting had emerged as one such 
tool gaining traction internationally. The pilots were launched in April 2012, ending in March 2014. New 
guidance was also being developed aimed at simplifying the planning system, which replaced previous 
policies including PPS9. µ[M]oving from a net loss of bio-diversity to achieving net gains for nature¶ 
constituted one component of the streaPOLQHG1DWLRQDO3ODQQLQJ3ROLF\)UDPHZRUN¶V (NPPF) definition of 
sustainable development (DCLG [define abbreviation2012, p. 3), based on a commitment laid out in the 
White Paper, while use of the mitigation hierarchy formed part of planning consent. 
While compensation had already been possible under PPS9, the proposals marked a step-change in 
how compensation agreements might be governed. For the first time a habitat-based metric was developed, 
ZKLFKZRXOGHQDEOHDQ\DUHDRIODQG¶VGLVWLQFWLYHQHVVDQGFRQGLtion to be numerically categorized, and its 
biodiversity value calculated in units per hectare. This allowed quantified loss and gain to be accounted for in 
different places over a period of time, while the generation of biodiversity units calculated in a consistent 
manner created the conditions for circulation of fungible credits. Guidance added further institutional 
architecture, with planning authorities made the primary regulatory bodies responsible for oversight of 
commercial trade of credits between developers and accredited providers. The proposals meanwhile were lent 
substantial support in reports by two market-orientated groups. The influential conservative think tank Policy 
Exchange and business-led Ecosystem Markets Task Force (EMTF), set up by the government to µreview the 
opportunities for UK business from expanding the trade in green goods and the market for sustainable natural 
services¶ (Defra 2011, p. 4), both made a mandatory programme their respective priority recommendations 
(Newey 2012; EMTF  2013). Having received lukewarm response initially, offsetting was also given fresh 
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impetus under Owen Paterson, appointed Secretary of State at Defra in late 2012. Paterson, though a 
contentious choice due to his controversial environmental views, quickly became one of offsettLQJ¶VPRVW
vocal supporters. In September 2013, the government published a Green Paper, setting out consultative plans 
for a national programme, confidently pledging concrete proposals by the end of the year (Defra 2013). 
The release of the Green Paper marked a high point in offsetting trajectory, but also a moment where 
the public debate became extremely fractured. The consultation garnered a surprisingly large number of 
responses given the relatively obscure corner of land-use planning concerned, and there was something of a 
EDFNODVKIURPSDUWVRIWKHSXEOLFDQGPHGLDDJDLQVWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSHUFHLYHGPRYHs (Mathiesen 2013). 
More significantly perhaps, the more institutionalized environmental interests, namely the conservationists 
and ecologists who in principle supported offsetting, raised serious concerns over the detail of the proposals. 
Political interest from the government soon cooled. As 2014 was drawing to a close, a year after consultation 
closed, Defra had yet to release the results, let alone publish more detailed plans. The pilots failed to produce 
meaningful results (Evans 2013), which most attributed to their voluntary nature. Their evaluation, promised 
for May 2014, remains unpublished. Following PateUVRQ¶VRZQGLVPLVsal in July 2014, many suspected the 
programme had been shelved, at least until the General Election of 2015. 
 
Planning and regulatory burden: impediments to growth 
 
7KH*UHHQ3DSHUJDYHWKHFOHDUHVWSLFWXUHWRGDWHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶Voverall objectives. Invoking the mantra 
of the µJOREDOUDFH¶, 3DWHUVRQ¶VIRUHZRUGVHWWKHWRQHµOur economy cannot afford planning processes that 
deal with biodiversity expensively and inefficiently or block the housing and infrastructure our economy 
needs to grow¶ (Defra 2013, p. 1). The UK economy was just beginning to show signs of sustained growth, 
amid a slow and turbulent post-2008 recovery. The recovery however appeared fragile, stimulated in part by 
an escalating property bubble in London and the south east, which was in turn fuelling an affordable housing 
crisis (Elliott 2014). Housebuilding was therefore identified as a priority, and freeing up land for construction 
became a focal point for policymakers, with pressure put on local planning authorities to deliver housing. For 
instance, the NPPF stipulated if local authorities could not satisfactorily establish their five-year housing land 
supply, developers could come forward with applications outside of local plans (ORFDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VPDLQ
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strategic planning document) with permission presumed. As one local government ecologist put it: µIt was 
SUREDEO\WKHZRUVWWLPHLQQDWLRQDOWHUPVWRODXQFKDVFKHPHRIWKLVQDWXUH«>'@HYHORSHUVKROGDOOWKHFDUGV
Local authorities are struggling to get even WKLQJVOLNHVRFLDOKRXVLQJDQGDIIRUGDEOHKRPHV«7U\LQJWRGR
extra things for biodiversity in that economic climate was very hard, and still is hard¶ (Pilot Leader A). 
Defra was also operating in a context where any regulation of business was assumed by government 
to be a burden that FRXOGVW\PLHJURZWK8QGHUWKH5HG7DSH&KDOOHQJHDµRQHLQWZRRXW¶SROLF\KDGEHHQ
attached to all new regulation affecting business (BIS [UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills] 
2013). As an explicit result Defra expressed preference for a voluntary-based system giving µdevelopers the 
choice to use offsetting¶ (Defra 2013, SDJDLQVWWKHDGYLFHRIQHDUO\DOORIRIIVHWWLQJ¶VVXSSRUWHUVDPRQJ
environmental and green business groups (Aldersgate Group 2013; Environment Bank 2013; Chartered 
Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management 2013; RSPB [Royal Society for the Protection of Birds] 
2013). These groups agreed a consistent and mandatory system would be necessary, otherwise most 
developers would simply opt against the extra cost of offsets, and weakHQSODQQHUV¶EDUJDLQLQJSRZHU
Resultant low demand would also inhibit supply and impair market efficiencies, and lack of a level regulatory 
playing field would XQGHUPLQHWKHJRDORIPDNLQJELRGLYHUVLW\¶VYDOXH consistently visible in financial 
decision-making. A voluntary approach did find favour among large developer groups however (Energy UK 
2013; Home Builders Federation 2013). Though offsetting was presented as a strategy that would benefit all 
parties, developers were particularly wary of additional costs. As a sustainability officer of one major 
housebuilder explained: µIt just seems like an additional regulatory burden, it's an additional cost. It's another 
box we have to tick, and that comes at a business cost and a capital cost¶ (Developer).  
 
Delivering for economy and environment in the face of deregulation, austerity and diminishing 
institutional capacity 
 
No net loss remained a stated objective, but Defra made clear avoiding extra cost was non-negotiable and that 
offsetting had to demonstrably make the planning system quicker, cheaper and more certain for business 
(Defra 2013, p. 8). This caused apprehension among green advocates, who questioned government intentions. 
As one professional ecologist, involved from an early stage, said: µThere's a very strong pro-development 
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DJHQGDDWWKHPRPHQWLVQ
WWKHUH"7KDW
VILQHEXWLWEULQJVFHUWDLQULVNVZLWKLW«,DPQHUYRXVDERXWWKHZD\
LWORRNVOLNHLW
VKHDGHGDWWKHPRPHQW«7KH\
UHWU\LQJWRGRD sort of fast-tracked, possibly disingenuous 
version of it¶ (Consultant Ecologist A). 
Discomfort around the growth narrative led to concerns offsetting could erode rather than reinforce 
existing protections. As an officer at one large conservation non-governmental organization explained: µWe 
would want a new system to capture the stuff that's currently not avoided. So it's turning approvals of low-
level harm into offsets. Clearly where government are coming from...there's a danger that government are 
trying to turn refusals of high harm into offsets. They're very different things, and we're coming at it from very 
different angles¶ (Conservationist A). 
At a time when insufficient land supply was being blamed on environmental regulations, Defra¶V
assertion the programme could reconcile long-running tensions between development and conservation 
remained unconvincing to many. According to insiders, it proved an impossible sell to the Treasury, who they 
said effectively blocked a mandatory system; uncertain costs meant Defra was unable to satisfy the strict 
economic appraisal for new policies.  
The lack of extra money for offsetting roused further fears around regulatory oversight. By the end of 
2016, Defra, already one of the smallest government departments, was set to have lost over 36% of its 
2010/2011 budget as part of government austerity measures (Jowit 2010). Cuts to local government, where 
offsetting would largely be delivered, were also severe. Data collected by the Association of Local 
Government Ecologists (ALGE) found 10 of 13 areas of local biodiversity work were undergoing µat least a 
60% budget cut¶ in 2011/2012 (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee 2012, p. 119). It raised 
alarm bells µRYHUWKHDSSDUHQWµPLV-PDWFK¶EHWZHHQWKHDVSLUDWLRQVDQGH[SHFWDWLRQH[SUHVVHGLQWKH1DWXUDO
Environment White Paper, when weighed against diminishing availability of resources within local 
government to actually engage with and undertake the sorts of biodiversity initiatives outlined¶ (p. 116). 
This exacerbated problems with effective discharge of statutory obligations, where biodiversity was 
DOUHDG\FULWLFDOO\XQGHUYDOXHG$FFRUGLQJWR$/*(¶VGDWDIURPRQO\% of local authorities employed 
an in-house ecologist. A more recent survey found 74% of planners had only a basic understanding of the 
mitigation hierarchy, with ALGE concluding many planning authorities µdo not currently have either the 
capacity or the competence to undertake the effective, and in some cases necessarily lawful, assessment of 
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planning applications where biodiversity is a material condition¶ (Oxford 2013, p. ii). One local ecologist 
expressed one concern RYHURIIVHWWLQJ¶VZLGHVSUHDGUROORXW µ,KDYHQ¶WEHHQDEOHto give it the attention it 
deserves%XWRQWKHRWKHUKDQGLW¶VSHUKDSVDPRUHUHDOLVWLFUHIOHFWLRQ,WKLQNRIKRZLWmight operate in the 
IXWXUHLQWHUPVRIKRZPXFKWLPHSHRSOHFDQJLYHLW«>7@KHZRUU\ZLOOEHWKDWWKRVHDXWKRULWLHVZKLFKGRQ
W
have access to ecological advice will have to take the metric calculations etcetera, that have been done by the 
consultant working on behalf of the developer, at face value¶ (Pilot Leader B). 
For offsetting to meet its stated objectives, well-resourced and knowledgeable regulators play a 
critical role for its advocates, but few expect additional investment to be forthcoming. Without this, much 
rides on how robust and objective the tools of evaluation are, and the impartiality and independence of those 
using them. 
 
The limits of ecological science 
 
0XFKRIRIIVHWWLQJ¶VDSSHDOFRPHVWKURXJKLWV technocratic FODLPWRUHSUHVHQWELRGLYHUVLW\¶VWUXHYDOXH
objectively with hard numbers. However, there remain significant practical questions surrounding 
measurement. What exactly should be measured? What are the best proxies for distinctiveness and condition? 
Which habitats (if any) should be considered irreplaceable? How do you quantify ecological connectivity? 
6KRXOGDVLWH¶VSRWHQWLDOELRGLYHUVLW\YDOXe be taken into account? What are the appropriate timescales? How 
do you deal with uncertainty and failures in restoration? Undoubtedly the decision over what precisely gets 
measured or what counts is likely to be biased towards the interests of one set of actors or another, and 
becomes the source of a repeated political contest over the detail of the instruments. The complex nature of 
ecology and biodiversity mean much work done by practitioners during the process, at every stage, is down to 
subjective judgements. Despite such concerns, there was a conspicuous absence of debate around the 
scientific underpinnings of offsetting in government proposals (British Ecological Society 2013). 
The Chartered Institute for Ecology and Environmental Management (2013, p. 4) noted how 
µmembers who have practical experience of using the current metric have commented that it is difficult to use. 
Added to this there are varying interpretations of the metric with at least three different calculation tools that 
CIEEM is aware of¶7KHDVVLJQPHQWRIKDELWDWVWRWKHPHWULF¶VFDWHJRULHVSURYHGDQDUHDZKHUHGDWDIURP
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assessments was not always clear. One local government ecologist explained that µLW¶VVRPHWLPHVVXUSULVLQJO\
difficult to categorically state what an area of habitat LVDQGZKDWFRQGLWLRQLW¶VLQHVSHFLDOO\LILW¶VVRUWRID
mosaic of habitats¶ (Pilot Leader B). Another, reflecting on their application of the metric, said: µIt works in 
some areas and some habitats, it doesn't work terribly well for farmland species and habitats. It also doesn't 
work very well in terms of ecological connectivity. That meant that with some sites it might show a 
reasonably low biodiversity value, whereas in functionality terms they were quite significant sites¶ (Pilot 
Leader A). 
The Chartered Institute for Ecology and Environmental Management called for clearer guidance, 
while a number of bodies made similar points as to the crudeness of the metric, emphasizing the need for it to 
reflect the full complexity of biodiversity (Environmental Audit Committee 2013).  
While Defra promised further refinement of the metric related to concerns raised by experts and 
practitioners, officials also stressed the trade-offs with overcomplicating the system of measurement: firstly, it 
would undermine its simplicity and legibility for different stakeholders, and hence transparency; secondly, a 
more complex metric would be time-consuming and costly to operate; and finally, the functioning of markets 
required a certain level of abstraction for the creation of fungible commodities. In any case, adding further 
layers and caveats to the tools of measurement seemed unlikely to make objective judgements much easier. 
The ambiguity and unpredictability which inhere in the very nature of the biophysical processes being 
observed, and related limits of ecological science, mean, in practice, politically mediated disputes at the 
moment of measurement are always likely. 
The process through which offset credits are produced, namely through ecological creation, 
restoration or enhancement, is itself an unpredictable and imprecise activity, prone to failure. This creates 
uncertainty at the credit side of the no net loss calculation, whereas loss is guaranteed on the debit side; indeed 
cumulative loss at a wider scale may not be taken into account at all. Ecologists and conservationists stressed 
the importance of this factor: µWe at our headquarters have massively struggled to do heathland restoration on 
RXURZQKHDGTXDUWHUV«:HNHHSJHWWLQJWKLQJVZURQJDQGWKLQJVJRZURQJ,W¶VMXVWDQLQGLFDWLRQRIKRZ
hard it is¶ (Conservationist A). Some ecologists pointed to limited understanding of particular conditions for 
restorationµYou see what's on the surface, but the soils have taken hundreds if not thousands of years to 
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form, or the hydrological regime. Those are much, much harder to recreate, which is why you might get good 
results quickly, but actually in the long term it's not worked¶ (Consultant Ecologist C). 
Gaps in knowledge and a perceived lack of recognition of this on the part of the government was 
compounded by a frustration at the lack of resources put into monitoring restoration: µIt's not a very sexy area 
of research, it requires long-term experiments that no one wants to pay for or support. We did have in this 
country some really good long-term experiments going on that have been stopped¶ (Consultant Ecologist A). 
Though monitoring is a condition of planning permissions where compensation has been offered, one 
ecologist explained: µIn practice it doesn't happen because the developer doesn't put up the money for that, the 
local authority hasn't the time to go back and check¶ (Consultant Ecologist B). 
In recognition of these difficulties, Defra¶VSURSRVDOVLQFOXGHd a set of multipliers, among others to 
incentivize offsets which are as proximal to impacts as possible and to compensate for time lags in restoration, 
for calculating required offset units to hedge against such uncertainty, weighted more heavily for the most 
problematic habitats, and against the hardest practice of habitat creation. The Green Paper also suggested use 
of a financial insurance scheme for cases of total failure. The scientific underpinning of multipliers however 
remained of questionable validity in policy circles, and particularly open to dispute in practice during 
negotiations.  
 
Pressures on ecological assessors 
 
(FRORJLVWV¶DELOLW\WRPDNe independent and impartial judgements during these contested negotiations is 
conditioned by the constellation of actors and relations of power through which they work, carried out at the 
interface between various vested interests, including governments, developers, landowners and the legal 
system, as well as conservation organizations and local communities. Professional ecologists also have their 
own direct interests, whose livelihoods may depend on maintaining relationships with several of these vested 
interests. The vast majority undertaking biodiversity assessments and making use of the metric would be 
SULYDWHFRQVXOWDQWVZRUNLQJIRUOLPLWHGSHULRGVRQFOLHQWV¶GHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWVLQDFRPSHWLWLYH
marketplace. According to various interviewees inside and outside the sector, the quality of work can vary. 
With existing arrangements, surveys can be carried out by untrained people for very low cost, which one 
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consultant described as an increasing problem for the profession. One local non-governmental organization 
officer explained, with regard to a consultancy they often deal with: µIf an application comes in that has a 
report supported by them we pay special scrutiny to it. I'm not saying that they do anything wrong, but 
sometimes it's not quite as comprehensive as you might wish¶ (Conservationist B). Talking specifically in 
relation to offsetting, another discussed howµcommercially, there is money to be made, there are jobs to be 
done. It's a very difficult environment for consultancies at the moment. Money is tight. Personally they might 
feel very uncomfortable about it, but they won't tell you, because what are they going to do? Walk out of their 
jobs?¶ (Consultant Ecologist B). 
Most however focused on the pressure felt by consultants: µEvery delay costs money. Every proposal 
to mitigate or avoid is potentially going to cost money. So you can come under a lot of pressure, not to see 
thLQJVILQGWKLQJVSHUKDSVQRWWRGRVXFKDWKRURXJKMREDV\RXVKRXOGRUQRWWRLQFOXGHLWLQ\RXUUHSRUW«
You often appear to be the bringer of bad news. Often biodiversity, and the ecologist's role are seen as a 
problem to be coped with¶ (Consultant Ecologist C). 
Under such circumstances rigorous and independent assessments are always difficult, regardless of 
the values and conscientiousness of individuals, though many ecologists and conservationists expressed a 
compunction to actively work on offsetting projects, despite their reservations, to make sure it was carried out 
as well as was possible. Though Defra had suggested a formal accreditation scheme, most supporters still felt 
strong regulatory oversight was needed. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
As the government showed signs of retreat in 2014, most interviewees reflected that it had been the wrong 
time for offsetting, at a juncture where national government had been particularly ill-equipped to initiate a 
scheme that was so complex and controversial. Factors included: the Conservative-led gRYHUQPHQW¶V
uncompromising position on growth and deregulation, as well as the shortcomings of the leadership; the 
political power of developers; political attacks on the inefficiencies of the planning system and environmental 
regulation; and the weak and diminishing capacities of planning authorities and regulatory agencies. 
8OWLPDWHO\WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSXUVXLWRIUHGXFLQJUHJXODWRU\EXUGHQIRUEXVLQHVVDWDOOFRVWVLQDQHIIRUWWR
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stimulate growth, remained non-negotiable and an insurmountable barrier to further progress. Coupled with a 
severe programme of austerity, under which public spending on institutional support for biodiversity-related 
regulation and research continues to decline, a mandatory offsetting system with the sufficient resources to 
deliver meaningful outcomes was never a serious possibility. This undermined the credibility of the system in 
WKHH\HVRIHFRORJLVWVDQGFRQVHUYDWLRQLVWVLQSDUWLFXODUEXWDOVRIRURIIVHWWLQJ¶VDGYRFDWHVLQWKHZRUOGRI
green business and environmental economics, who recognized the necessity of an interventionist state in 
navigating a complex social, political and ecological terrain, for the creation and integrity of a regulatory 
market. Defra¶VIDLOXUHWRHQUROWKHVHJURXSV, who showed little opposition to offsetting in principle, into the 
creation RIDQHZPDUNHWV\VWHPH[SRVHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶Vunwillingness and inability to intervene and 
regulate on the scale deemed necessary. As economic growth continued into 2014, and other revisions to 
planning and housing policies took effect, the government became less willing to take the political and 
economic risks now associated with its offsetting proposals.  
7KHVWRU\RIWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶Vtentative moves to roll out a national biodiversity offsetting 
programme is in many ways context specific, politically mediated through a series of contingent factors and 
events. It is possible a change of government might open up different possibilities or that the issues described 
in this paper simply reflect teething problems of a longer iterative journey. Looking beyond the immediate 
politics there is perhaps something more to learn from the UK, relating to the more structural constraints 
through which offsetting is conceived as a solution to biodiversity loss. 7KRXJKWKH8.¶VSDUWLFXODUEUDQGRI
QHROLEHUDOJRYHUQDQFHDQGJURZWKSOD\HGDSDUWELRGLYHUVLW\RIIVHWWLQJ¶VWUDQVQDWLRQDODSSHDOLVSUHGLFDWHGRQ
and purports to deal with the conditions of those very political and social arrangements: a neoliberal world 
where perennially declining public resources for conservation are deemed inevitable; where top-down 
command and control regulation is judged to be inherently inflexible, inefficient and ineffective; where a 
notion of economic growth remains an essential condition of all forms of governance and prosperity; and 
where the expansion of economic and market logic is seen as the common sense solution to all perceived 
market or regulatory failures (Büscher et al. 2012; Davies 2014),WLVLQWKLVFRQWH[WWKDWRIIVHWWLQJ¶V political 
attraction lies; in its pledge to deliver market solutions that address both the challenges of curbing biodiversity 
loss and complying with regulatory regimes at different scales on the one hand, and securing economic growth 
on the other.  
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When it comes down to the detail however, the promised reconciliation of economy and ecology 
remains elusive. Offsetting offers a way to leverage some financial compensation to move nature elsewhere, 
but the tensions and disparities embedded in existing socioecological relations of power, which constrained 
meaningful compensation regimes in the first place (market or otherwise) have not been resolved. The 
meeting of economy and ecology reverts to a political struggle in which well-meaning environmentalists try to 
claw something back for biodiversity, in a context where growth cannot be compromised. This is reflected in 
the pressure on consultant ecologists to give client the easiest and cheapest option to get their permit; in the 
overwhelming pressure on local planners to deliver housing above the interests of biodiversity; and the 
QDWLRQDOVWDWH¶VQRQ-negotiable attitude towards a particular form of economic development. In this sense, the 
UK is far from an exceptional case. Moves to develop an offsetting framework at the European level by the 
European Commission for instance have been following a similar path, in a context where many member 
states are undergoing deep austerity measures to reduce public deficits. Here too, offsetting is firmly situated 
and justified in a deregulatory climate in which environmental protections are under attack for undermining 
business competitiveness and economic recovery (Kaminski 2014; European Commission 2015). Quite apart 
from the implications for similarly positioned post-industrial societies, the UK experience raises wider 
questions RYHURIIVHWWLQJ¶VSRWHQWLDOLQSRorer parts of the world with significantly lower institutional and 
regulatory capacity.  
In studies of the success of actually existing offsetting, the evidence seems to suggest that no net loss 
is rarely delivered (Maron et al. 2012; Curran et al. 2013). This is something most practitioners and all but the 
most zealous advocates admit, identifying effective monitoring, compliance and enforcement as the critical 
challenges7KHDXWKRUVRIWKHVHVWXGLHVKRZHYHUPDNHDIXUWKHUFODLPUHJDUGLQJRIIVHWWLQJ¶VJovernance: that 
realistically large multipliers to mitigate restoration failure rates would be µan insurmountable institutional 
challenge¶ (Curran et al. 2013, p. 628) and µpolitically and economically unacceptable¶ (Maron et al. 2012, p. 
145). This raises an issue at the heart of debates around biodiversity offsetting and similar market-based 
instruments: are the problems which beset these systems issues of poor implementation or fundamental 
conceptual flaws? The question raised by this paper is not so much over the technical feasibility of offsetting, 
but the extent to which such technical complexities can be satisfactorily worked through the political milieu in 
which it is embedded and constituted. On the one hand, optimists believe implementation problems are merely 
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issues of refining the metrics and rules, and garnering sufficient political will, while on the other many critics 
dismiss market instruments as anti-ecological or false solutions.  
As Carton (2014) concluded in the context of carbon markets, empirically observable failures do not 
prove the inherent inadequacy of the market instrument as such in reducing carbon emissions, the success of 
which is more concretely dependent on the soundness of the emissions cap and the effective imposition of 
scarcity. Instead, Carton (2014, p. 1012) argued, µthe limits to carbon trading are defined by the broader 
economic framework within which it operates. As a market-based instrument, emissions trading has fully 
internalized the economic imperatives of market society¶. Despite the differing technical challenges and 
institutional settings, this analysis would seem equally applicable to the case of biodiversity offsetting. 
Authors have for the most part failed to grasp the intimate nature of this relationship, and its implications for 
the design, implementation and contestations around putting offset programmes into operation between the 
divergent demands of deregulation and reregulation. This critical tension at the heart of biodiversity offsets 
needs to be more explicitly acknowledged in discussions over how to move forward. Though achieving no net 
loss through offsetting may be theoretically possible, it seems highly unlikely that the contemporary state 
could in practice mobilize at the required scale to deliver its stated objectives.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I have documented and analysed the difficulties encountered by the UK in its attempts to roll out a 
biodiversity offsetting programme for England. Biodiversity offsets are becoming an increasingly popular 
policy mechanism around the world, as policymakers seek solutions to the twin dilemmas of delivering 
economic growth while meeting mandated conservation goals. However, the troubled development of the 
policy in the UK should give pause for thought for both policymakers and advocates who maintain faith in the 
promise of market solutions delivering for both economy and biodiversity. 
Market-based policies for nature conservation have traditionally proved difficult to put into operation, 
and the UK experience demonstrates many of the characteristic problems of environmental market-making 
and commodification identified in the critical literature. What is particularly revealing in this case study is 
how these dilemmas played out in the early stages of such a process, at a point where the tensions appeared at 
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their sharpest, and the necessarily constructive role undertaken by the state as it tried (unsuccessfully) to 
resolve them. In particular, the analysis has highlighted the importance of the irreducible relationship between 
the successful roll-out and implementation of such market-based instruments, and their situation within 
broader political economic paradigms; in this case post-2008 variants of neoliberal capitalism. Special 
attention should be paid to this relationship, its historical specificity and the attendant limits placed upon 
environmental markets. 
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